@canonical/utils
Standard utility functions for Canonical's Web Engineering team
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual to CI/CD publish under the canonical org; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of human publisher is expected when moving to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.33.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.32.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.31.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.30.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.29.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.28.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.27.0 | 1 / 9 | |
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.24.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.22.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.21.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.20.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.17.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.17.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.16.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.15.1 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.15.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.14.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.13.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.12.0 | 1 / 8 | |
| 0.11.0 | 0 / 8 | |
| 0.10.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.9.0 | 0 / 4 |
v0.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.32.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.31.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.30.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.29.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.20.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.17.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (ad.vl) than the most recent previously approved version (jmuzina) on 2026-02-23, but ad.vl is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.