@cap-js/ord
CAP Plugin for generating ORD document.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; expected for SAP/cap-js org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): sap-ospo-admin is SAP's OSS admin account; consistent with org governance, not a takeover. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:cors | AI (typosquat): Scoped SAP package @cap-js/ord; Levenshtein match to 'cors' is a false positive. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:zod | AI (typosquat): Scoped SAP package @cap-js/ord; Levenshtein match to 'zod' is a false positive. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Standard Basic Auth header decoding pattern; not obfuscation or payload hiding. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Loads sibling @cap-js plugin modules by name from a controlled PROTOCOL_PROVIDERS map; not arbitrary code loading. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.8.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.7.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.6.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.5.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.5 | 5 / 8 | |
| 1.4.4 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.4.3 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.4.2 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.4.1 | 5 / 7 | |
| 1.4.0 | 5 / 6 | |
| 1.3.14 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.3.13 | 5 / 4 | |
| 1.3.12 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.3.11 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.3.10 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.3.9 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.3.8 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.3.7 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.3.6 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.3.5 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.3.4 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.3.3 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.3.2 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.3.1 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.3.0 | 4 / 3 |
v1.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.