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@cap-js/postgres

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CDS database service for Postgres

14
Versions
Apache-2.0
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

sap_extncreposcap-npm

Keywords

CAPCDSPostgres

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; stable pattern for this SAP org package. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): SAP CAP packages consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@cap-js/db-service AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same SAP cap-js/cds-dbs monorepo; stable false positive for this package. ai

Versions (showing 14 of 14)

Version Deps Published
2.3.0 2 / 0
2.2.1 2 / 0
2.2.0 2 / 0
2.1.3 2 / 0
2.1.2 2 / 0
2.1.1 2 / 0
2.1.0 2 / 0
2.0.6 2 / 0
2.0.5 2 / 0
2.0.4 2 / 0
2.0.3 2 / 0
2.0.2 2 / 0
2.0.1 2 / 0
2.0.0 2 / 0

v2.3.0

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.2.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cap-npm → GitHub Actions (on 2026-04-23) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.2.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cap-npm → GitHub Actions (on 2026-03-09) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.1.3

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cap-npm → GitHub Actions (on 2026-02-03) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.1.2

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cap-npm → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-19) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.1.1

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cap-npm → GitHub Actions (on 2025-12-15) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: cap-npm → GitHub Actions (on 2025-11-26) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v2.0.6

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.5

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.0.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.