@capacitor-community/fcm
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| email-domain | unclaimed-email:stackspace.ca | AI (email-domain): Established community plugin under capacitor-community org; email domain issue is a metadata risk, not active compromise evidence. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established community plugin; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.1.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 8.0.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 8.0.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 7.3.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 7.2.0 | 0 / 16 |
v8.0.1
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stackspace.ca' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v8.0.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stackspace.ca' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.0
2 findingsMaintainer email '[email protected]' uses domain 'stackspace.ca' which has no DNS records. An attacker could register this domain to hijack the maintainer identity.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.