@carbon-labs/wc-style-picker
Carbon Labs - style-picker component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): carbon-bot is IBM's automation account with strong track record; transition from ibmdesign to carbon-bot is a known IBM org pattern. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:es/components/style-picker-group/src/style-picker-group.scss.js | AI (source-diff): Minified CSS-in-JS (Carbon Design System tokens via lit.css); not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/components/style-picker-group/src/style-picker-group.scss.js | AI (source-diff): Minified CSS-in-JS (Carbon Design System tokens via lit.css); not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:es/components/style-picker-section/src/style-picker-section.scss.js | AI (source-diff): Minified CSS-in-JS (Carbon Design System tokens via lit.css); not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/components/style-picker-section/src/style-picker-section.scss.js | AI (source-diff): Minified CSS-in-JS (Carbon Design System tokens via lit.css); not obfuscated malicious code. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Carbon Labs packages consistently lack Sigstore provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): IBM telemetry postinstall is standard across carbon-labs packages; not malicious. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Component library README with links is normal; not a spam/phishing package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@ibm/telemetry-js | AI (phantom-deps): Used by ibmtelemetry CLI in postinstall, not directly imported in source. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped runtime dep loaded by convention in build output. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.33.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.26.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.25.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.23.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.22.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.19.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.18.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 5 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 0 |
v0.33.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.25.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.22.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
5 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.