@celo/contractkit
5
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
SLSA provenance attestation
npm registry signatures
gitHead linked
Maintainers
app-toolingjcortejosoalvarof2pahor
Keywords
celoblockchaincontractkit
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Coincides with verified provenance-improving CI/CD publisher transition. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Explained by legitimate monorepo release cadence and provenance transition. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:fp-ts | AI (phantom-deps): Config-referenced dependency, not a real risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/bn.js | AI (phantom-deps): @types/bn.js is declared in deps to provide types to downstream consumers; standard pattern for TypeScript SDKs. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/debug | AI (phantom-deps): @types/debug is declared in deps to provide types to downstream consumers; standard pattern for TypeScript SDKs. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 11.0.0 | 11 / 10 | |
| 10.0.3 | 13 / 11 | |
| 10.0.2 | 13 / 11 | |
| 10.0.1 | 13 / 11 | |
| 10.0.0 | 13 / 11 |
v11.0.0
2 findings
INFO
Has SLSA provenance attestation
provenance
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
INFO
Publisher changed: app-tooling → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-15, now via trusted publisher with provenance)
provenance
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (app-tooling) on 2026-06-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.