@celo/wallet-local
5
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
SLSA provenance attestation
npm registry signatures
gitHead linked
Maintainers
app-toolingjcortejosoalvarof2pahor
Keywords
celoblockchainsdk
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:hex-decode | AI (semgrep): Hex decoding in local-signer.js is standard cryptographic key handling (converting hex private key to Buffer for ecsign). This is expected behavior for a wallet signing library. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@celo/base | AI (phantom-deps): @celo/base is a first-party same-org dependency; phantom detection is a false positive for intra-org transitive/re-export patterns. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 8.0.4 | 6 / 4 | |
| 8.0.3 | 5 / 5 | |
| 8.0.2 | 5 / 5 | |
| 8.0.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 8.0.0 | 5 / 5 |
v8.0.4
2 findings
INFO
Has SLSA provenance attestation
provenance
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
INFO
Publisher changed: app-tooling → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-15, now via trusted publisher with provenance)
provenance
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (app-tooling) on 2026-06-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.