@cerbos/embedded
Client library for interacting with embedded Cerbos policy decision points generated by Cerbos Hub from server-side Node.js and browser-based applications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Offset by new CI/CD provenance attestation; expected during publisher/pipeline migration. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Trusted-publisher provenance confirms legitimate org transfer, not compromise. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cerbos/core | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package from the same cerbos-sdk-javascript monorepo; not an independent risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 31 of 31)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.15.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.15.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.15.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.15.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.15.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.14.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.14.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.14.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.13.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.13.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.13.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.13.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.13.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.13.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.12.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.12.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.11.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.11.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.9.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.7.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.7.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.6.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.6.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 0 |
v0.11.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.7.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.6.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ahaines.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ahaines.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.