@cerbos/files
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Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Byproduct of CI/CD publish transition, offset by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Transfer to org's trusted CI/CD publisher, attested via Sigstore provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 34 of 34)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.14 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.13 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.12 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.11 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.10 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 2 / 0 |
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.5
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ahaines.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.