@cerbos/http
Client library for interacting with the Cerbos policy decision point service over HTTP from browser-based applications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Offset by SLSA provenance + trusted CI/CD publisher move, not a compromise signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Org account transition with provenance attestation, legitimate publisher migration. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cerbos/core | AI (dependencies): First-party sibling package in the same cerbos-sdk-javascript monorepo; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.29.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.28.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.28.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.27.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.26.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.26.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.26.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.25.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.24.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.24.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.24.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.23.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.22.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.22.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.21.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.21.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.21.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.20.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.19.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.19.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.19.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.18.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.18.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.17.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.16.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.15.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.14.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.13.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.12.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.11.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.10.1 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.10.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.9.0 | 3 / 1 | |
| 0.8.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 1 / 0 |
v0.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.20.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.1
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.18.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.17.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ahaines.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.