@cerbos/opentelemetry
OpenTelemetry instrumentation for the @cerbos/grpc and @cerbos/http client libraries
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Byproduct of CI/CD migration; provenance attestation compensates. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Same org's CI/CD publisher, confirmed by SLSA provenance, not compromise. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Org migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA provenance; not a takeover signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): cerbosdev removal reflects org-level CI publishing transition, consistent with SLSA attestation. | ai |
Versions (showing 43 of 43)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.11.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.10.4 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.10.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.10.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.10.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.8.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.8.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.7.3 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.7.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 0.6.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.6.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.6.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.6.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.9 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.8 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.7 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.2.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 0 |
v0.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.6
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.5
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-04-17, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.4
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cerbosdev.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (cerbosdev) than the most recent previously approved version (ahaines) on 2024-03-08, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: ahaines.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.