@cesium/engine
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Used in KTX2 transcoding worker for named function creation; standard pattern in compiled/bundled worker code. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:api-obfuscation-reflect | AI (semgrep): Reflect.get in a Proxy handler trap is idiomatic JS; not obfuscation. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Dynamic require in geometry worker is a documented worker-module loading pattern for CesiumJS. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Cesium org package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
v26.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (lukemckinstry) than the most recent previously approved version (jjspace) on 2026-06-01, but lukemckinstry is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v25.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.