@chainflip/sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; expected pattern for this org. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Mature SDK package; sparse README/keywords are cosmetic, not spam indicators. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@chainflip/bitcoin | AI (dependencies): First-party dependency from the same chainflip-io monorepo; not a third-party risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.1.1 | 9 / 1 | |
| 2.1.0 | 9 / 1 | |
| 2.0.3 | 9 / 2 | |
| 2.0.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 9 / 2 |
v2.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.