@chainlink/cre-sdk
The Chainlink Runtime Environment (CRE) SDK for TypeScript enables developers to write decentralized [Chainlink Runtime Environment Workflows](https://docs.chain.link/cre/) in Typescript.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/generated/capabilities/networking/confidentialhttp/v1alpha/client_pb.js | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: protobuf fileDesc() base64 descriptor, generated artifact, not malicious payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/generated/capabilities/blockchain/evm/v1alpha/client_pb.js | AI (source-diff): Base64 in fileDesc() calls is standard protobuf-es generated code pattern, not malicious payload. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | url-dep:chain-selectors | AI (npm-metadata): devDependency pointing to Chainlink's own chain-selectors repo; stable pattern for this org's packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Established Chainlink SDK with 51 versions; missing metadata fields are cosmetic, not indicative of spam. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:BUSL-1.1 | AI (license): BUSL-1.1 is Chainlink's standard license across their packages; stable for this org. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@chainlink/cre-sdk-javy-plugin | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling package declared as dep but used as a plugin artifact, not directly imported in JS; stable pattern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@bufbuild/protoc-gen-es | AI (phantom-deps): protoc-gen-es is a codegen tool used via buf config, not a runtime import; phantom-dep is expected. | ai |
Versions (showing 25 of 25)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.10.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.9.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.8.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.7.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.6.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.5.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.4.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.3.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.3.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.2.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.1.4 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.1.3 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.1.2 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.1.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.1.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.9 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.8 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.7 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.6 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.5 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.4 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.3 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.2 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 1.0.0 | 6 / 8 |
v1.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.9.0
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#116ebbce88b36d4e76a03c12b3437ed33a5f9860' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.8.0
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#a86ae261a09f805ea37165f58b017b4538e2e3bb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.7.0
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#a86ae261a09f805ea37165f58b017b4538e2e3bb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.5.0
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#a86ae261a09f805ea37165f58b017b4538e2e3bb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#a86ae261a09f805ea37165f58b017b4538e2e3bb' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
2 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
2 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.1
2 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.9
4 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.8
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.6
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.5
3 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsDependency 'chain-selectors' in `devDependencies` points to 'git+https://github.com/smartcontractkit/chain-selectors.git#8b963095ae797a3024c8e55822cced7bf618176f' instead of a registry version. URL dependencies bypass the registry and can be swapped at any time. A 40-character commit SHA in a dependency URL is a strong supply-chain signal — the 2026-05-11 TanStack/Mini Shai-Hulud attack used this exact shape in `optionalDependencies` to smuggle a malicious payload past lifecycle-script and OSV checks.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.