@chat-adapter/gchat
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is consistent with Vercel's org-wide release automation; SLSA attestation confirms integrity. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): vercel-release-bot and matt.straka are consistent with Vercel org ownership of this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Publisher cramforce has a strong established track record; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 45 of 45)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.30.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.29.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.28.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.27.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.26.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.25.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.24.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.23.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.22.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.21.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.20.2 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.20.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.20.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.19.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.18.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.17.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.16.1 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.16.0 | 4 / 4 | |
| 4.15.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.14.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.13.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.13.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.13.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.13.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.13.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.12.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.11.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.10.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.10.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.9.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.9.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.8.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.7.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.7.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.7.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.6.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.5.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.4.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.4.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.3.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 4.2.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 4.1.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 4.0.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 4.0.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 4.0.0 | 2 / 4 |
v4.30.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.28.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.27.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.26.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.25.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.24.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.23.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.15.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.14.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.