@checkstack/auth-credential-backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/backend-api | AI (dependencies): workspace:* dep is a monorepo-internal sibling package, not an external unvetted dependency. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all @checkstack/* packages; no CI provenance setup in this org. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal monorepo package; missing description is expected for private workspace packages. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal @checkstack monorepo package; missing metadata is consistent across the scope, not a spam/malware indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.47 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.46 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.45 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.44 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.43 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.42 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.41 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.40 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.39 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.38 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.37 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.36 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.35 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.34 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.32 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.29 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.28 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.24 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.23 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.20 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.19 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.18 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.16 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.15 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.13 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.11 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 2 |
v0.0.47
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.46
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.45
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.38
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.32
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.28
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.20
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.