@checkstack/healthcheck-script-backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| license | uncommon-license:Elastic-2.0 | AI (license): Elastic-2.0 is a known, intentional license choice for this package family; stable across versions. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Pattern is subprocess env inheritance, not exfiltration; stable for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal @checkstack scoped package; missing metadata is consistent with private monorepo tooling, not spam. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal scoped package; missing description is expected for private tooling. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Consistent across all @checkstack packages; org-level pattern, not a per-version concern. | ai |
Versions (showing 30 of 30)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.7.2 | 5 / 4 | |
| 0.5.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.4.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.4.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.4.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.17 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.16 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.15 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.14 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.13 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.12 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.11 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.10 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.8 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.3.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.12 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.11 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.10 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.9 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.8 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.7 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.5 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.4 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.3 | 3 / 4 | |
| 0.0.2 | 3 / 4 |
v0.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.5.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.16
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 145 | cmd: [config.command, ...config.args], 146 | cwd: config.cwd, > 147 | env: { ...process.env, ...config.env }, 148 | stdout: "pipe", 149 | stderr: "pipe",
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.1
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 144 | cmd: [config.command, ...config.args], 145 | cwd: config.cwd, > 146 | env: { ...process.env, ...config.env }, 147 | stdout: "pipe", 148 | stderr: "pipe",
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets 169 | cmd: [config.command, ...config.args], 170 | cwd: config.cwd, > 171 | env: { ...process.env, ...config.env }, 172 | stdout: "pipe", 173 | stderr: "pipe",
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.