@checkstack/notification-backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/automation-backend | AI (dependencies): Same org scope (@checkstack); consistent with the package's internal ecosystem pattern once the dep itself is vetted. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): @orpc/server is a legitimate RPC library; addition is consistent with this org's backend package evolution. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@orpc/server | AI (dependencies): @orpc/server is a legitimate open-source RPC library; stable dependency for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/cache-utils | AI (dependencies): Same-org @checkstack scoped package; consistent with the ecosystem pattern of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/cache-api | AI (dependencies): Same-org @checkstack scoped package; consistent with the ecosystem pattern of this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/auth-backend | AI (dependencies): Monorepo workspace sibling; not an external supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/queue-api | AI (dependencies): Monorepo workspace sibling; not an external supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/auth-common | AI (dependencies): Monorepo workspace sibling; not an external supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/backend-api | AI (dependencies): Monorepo workspace sibling; not an external supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/notification-common | AI (dependencies): Monorepo workspace sibling; not an external supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal @checkstack org package; sparse metadata is consistent across the whole org's packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@checkstack/queue-api | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep; phantom-dep heuristic unreliable for monorepo-style packages. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across @checkstack org; not a malware signal here. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Internal tooling package; missing description is stable across this org's packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 29 of 29)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.2 | 13 / 7 | |
| 1.3.0 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.2.0 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.1.0 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.0.5 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.0.4 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.0.3 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.0.2 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.0.1 | 12 / 7 | |
| 1.0.0 | 12 / 7 | |
| 0.2.1 | 12 / 6 | |
| 0.2.0 | 12 / 6 | |
| 0.1.23 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.1.21 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.1.20 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.1.16 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.1.13 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.8 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.7 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.6 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.5 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.4 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.3 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.2 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.1 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.1.0 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.4 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.3 | 9 / 8 | |
| 0.0.2 | 9 / 8 |
v1.4.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.23
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.21
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.16
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.