@checkstack/notification-teams-backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| license | uncommon-license:Elastic-2.0 | AI (license): Elastic-2.0 is a legitimate license; stable for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Likely a CI/publish environment change; no other corroborating risk signals present. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@checkstack/backend-api | AI (dependencies): workspace:* sibling dep in a monorepo; not an external unvetted package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Scoped internal plugin package; missing description is consistent across the @checkstack ecosystem. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance across all @checkstack packages; not a per-version risk signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal scoped plugin package; missing metadata is consistent with private ecosystem tooling, not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 47 of 47)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.48 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.47 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.46 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.45 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.44 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.43 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.42 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.41 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.40 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.39 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.38 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.37 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.36 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.35 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.34 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.33 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.32 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.31 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.30 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.29 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.28 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.27 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.26 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.25 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.24 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.23 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.22 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.21 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.20 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.19 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.18 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.17 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.16 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.15 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.14 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.13 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.12 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.11 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.10 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.9 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.8 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.7 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 4 / 2 |
v0.0.48
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.47
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.46
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.45
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.44
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.43
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.42
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.41
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.40
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.39
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.38
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.37
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.36
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.35
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.34
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.33
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.32
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.29
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.28
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.25
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.24
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
v0.0.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.20
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
v0.0.19
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.17
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.16
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: enyineer.
v0.0.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.