@chnak/weixin-bot
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.2.9 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.2.8 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.2.7 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.2.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 1.2.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 2 |
v1.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.