@choice-ui/popover
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@choice-ui/modal | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same @choice-ui monorepo; expected internal dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@choice-ui/shared | AI (dependencies): Sibling package in the same @choice-ui monorepo; expected internal dependency. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm); no other risk signals present for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.12 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.11 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.10 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.9 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.8 | 5 / 7 | |
| 0.0.7 | 5 / 7 |
v0.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.