@christiandoxa/prodex-darwin-x64
Native prodex binary for x86_64-apple-darwin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform binary package; vendor/prodex is the intended native binary artifact, attested via SLSA provenance. | ai |
Versions (showing 100 of 227)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.75.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.74.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.73.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.72.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.71.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.70.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.69.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.68.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.67.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.66.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.65.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.64.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.63.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.62.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.61.0 | 0 / 0 | |
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| 0.40.0 | 0 / 0 | |
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| 0.12.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.11.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.10.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.9.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.136 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.135 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.134 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.133 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.132 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.131 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.130 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.129 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.128 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.127 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.126 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.125 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.124 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.123 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.122 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.121 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.120 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.119 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.118 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.117 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.116 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.115 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.114 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.113 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.112 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.111 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.2.110 | 0 / 0 |
v0.75.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.74.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.73.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.72.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.71.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.70.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.69.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.68.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.67.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.66.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.65.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.64.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.63.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.62.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.61.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.60.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.59.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.58.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.57.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.56.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.55.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.54.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.53.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.52.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.51.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.50.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.49.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.48.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.47.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.46.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.45.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.44.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.43.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.42.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.41.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.40.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.39.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.38.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.37.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.36.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.35.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.34.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.33.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.32.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.31.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.30.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.29.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.28.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.27.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.26.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.25.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.24.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.23.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.22.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.20.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.19.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.18.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.17.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.16.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.15.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.14.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.13.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.12.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.11.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.10.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.9.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.136
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.135
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.134
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.133
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.132
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.131
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.130
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.129
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.128
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.127
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.126
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.125
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.124
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.123
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.122
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.121
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.120
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.119
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.118
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.117
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.116
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.115
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.114
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.113
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.112
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.111
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.110
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • vendor/prodex
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.