@cipherstash/auth
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): Standard NAPI-RS platform binary loader; pkg is constrained to known optional dependency names. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.36.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.35.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.34.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.34.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 0.34.0 | 0 / 3 |
v0.36.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.35.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.34.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.34.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.34.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.