@cipherstash/protect
7
Versions
—
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
SLSA provenance attestation
npm registry signatures
No source commit
Maintainers
cs_lindsaydrew_cipherstashjames-sadlerdan-drapercs-zcjbrewertobyhede
Keywords
encryptedquerylanguagetypescripttsprotect
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): CipherStash org package; no provenance is consistent across their published versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:zod | AI (phantom-deps): zod is explicitly declared as a direct runtime dependency in package.json; phantom-dep finding is a false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 12.0.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 11.1.2 | 6 / 8 | |
| 11.1.1 | 6 / 8 | |
| 11.1.0 | 6 / 8 | |
| 10.2.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 10.1.0 | 4 / 8 | |
| 10.0.2 | 4 / 8 |
v12.0.1
2 findings
INFO
Has SLSA provenance attestation
provenance
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
INFO
Publisher changed: cs-zcjbrewer → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-08, now via trusted publisher with provenance)
provenance
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (cs-zcjbrewer) on 2026-07-08, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.