@cipherstash/protect-ffi
> [!IMPORTANT] > If you are looking to implement this package into your application please use the official [protect package](https://github.com/cipherstash/protectjs).
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/wasm/protect_ffi_bg.js | AI (source-diff): wasm-bindgen generated glue code, not network+exec malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/wasm/protect_ffi_inline.js | AI (source-diff): Base64-inlined wasm binary from documented inline-wasm.mjs build script. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Wasm binary is the compiled Rust FFI core, documented build output for this native binding package. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase matches newly added wasm build scripts, not injected payload. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New files are wasm build output tied to added build:wasm scripts. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): cs-zcjbrewer is a CipherStash org account with 37 approved packages; consistent with internal maintainer rotation. | ai |
Versions (showing 33 of 33)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.29.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.28.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.27.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.26.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.25.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.24.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.23.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.22.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.21.4 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.21.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.21.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.21.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.21.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 0.20.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.20.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.20.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.19.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.18.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.17.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.17.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.16.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.16.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.15.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.14.2 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.14.1 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.14.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.12.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.11.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.10.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.9.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.8.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.7.0 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.5.4 | 1 / 4 |
v0.29.0
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/wasm/protect_ffi_bg.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.28.0
5 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/wasm/protect_ffi_bg.wasm
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.27.0
4 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.26.0
4 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.