@cipherstash/protect-ffi-darwin-arm64
Prebuilt binary package for `@cipherstash/protect-ffi` on `darwin-arm64`.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Manual-to-CI/CD provenance improvement, not a compromise indicator. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Coincides with legitimate CI/CD migration, not suspicious. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Neon prebuilt binary package; index.node is the intentional deliverable for this platform shard. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary shards have no deps, no keywords, minimal README by design — not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 18 of 18)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.30.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.29.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.28.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.27.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.26.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.25.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.24.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.23.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.22.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.21.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.21.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.21.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.21.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.20.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.20.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.20.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.19.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.18.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.30.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.29.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.28.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.27.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-07-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.21.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.20.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.19.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.18.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.