@circuitz/std
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:zod | AI (typosquat): Scoped package @circuitz/std is unrelated to zod; Levenshtein match is coincidental. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.16 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.15 | 2 / 5 | |
| 0.1.14 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.13 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.12 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.11 | 2 / 3 | |
| 0.1.10 | 2 / 3 |
v0.1.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.