@cleartrip/ct-design-icon-button
Icon Button component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cleartrip/ct-design-theme | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dep likely re-exported via barrel; stable false positive for this design-system package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Cleartrip design system packages consistently lack provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.6.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 5.5.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 5.2.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 5.1.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 5.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 3.20.0 | 1 / 2 |
v5.6.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sidhantrajan) than the most recent previously approved version (saranshdawra) on 2026-06-02, but sidhantrajan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.5.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sidhantrajan) than the most recent previously approved version (saranshdawra) on 2026-06-02, but sidhantrajan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.2.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sidhantrajan) than the most recent previously approved version (saranshdawra) on 2026-06-02, but sidhantrajan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sidhantrajan) than the most recent previously approved version (saranshdawra) on 2026-06-02, but sidhantrajan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v5.0.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sidhantrajan) than the most recent previously approved version (saranshdawra) on 2026-06-02, but sidhantrajan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.