@cleartrip/ct-platform-supercoins-bottom-sheet
SuperCoins Bottom Sheet Component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): ashokmpatel is an established Cleartrip org publisher with clean track record; transition appears legitimate. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Cleartrip org packages consistently lack provenance; stable false positive for this package family. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cleartrip/ct-design-button | AI (phantom-deps): Internal org design-system dep; likely re-exported or used indirectly, stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3.30 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.29 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.28 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.27 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.26 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.25 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.24 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.23 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.22 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.21 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.20 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.19 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.18 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.17 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.16 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.15 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.14 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.13 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.12 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.11 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.10 | 4 / 0 |
v2.3.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.27
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.26
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.24
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.23
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.22
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.21
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.20
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.19
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.18
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.17
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.16
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-09-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.12
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-07-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.