@cleartrip/ct-platform-supercoins-chip
SuperCoins Chip Component
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source, so a manually published version cannot be tied back to a reviewed commit.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Cleartrip org package; provenance attestation not used across their package ecosystem. | ai |
Versions (showing 35 of 35)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.3.32 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.31 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.30 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.29 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.28 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.27 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.26 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.25 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.24 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.23 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.22 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.21 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.20 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.19 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.18 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.17 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.16 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.15 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.14 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.13 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.12 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.11 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.10 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.9 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.8 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.7 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.5 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.2 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.3.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.1 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.1.0 | 4 / 0 | |
| 2.0.0 | 4 / 0 |
v2.3.32
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.31
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.30
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.8
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (ritesh.kumarjena) than the most recent previously approved version (ashokmpatel) on 2025-04-16, but ritesh.kumarjena is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.3.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (ashokmpatel) than the most recent previously approved version (ritesh.kumarjena) on 2025-04-11, but ashokmpatel is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v2.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.