@cleocode/cleo
CLEO CLI — the assembled product consuming @cleocode/core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sqlite-vec | AI (phantom-deps): Optional/config-referenced dependency; consistent with other accepted phantom-deps in this package. | ai | |
| install-scripts | install-script:postinstall | AI (install-scripts): Postinstall runs a local node script (node bin/postinstall.js); no remote fetch or obfuscation; stable pattern across 198 versions. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publisher with SLSA provenance; legitimate automation pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:pino-roll | AI (phantom-deps): pino-roll is referenced in config files only, not directly imported. Stable config-only reference pattern for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:sql.js | AI (phantom-deps): sql.js is referenced in config files only, not directly imported. This is a stable pattern for this package — config-only or peer dependency reference, not a security concern. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cleocode/lafs-protocol | AI (dependencies): Same-scope @cleocode namespace dependency; consistent with internal monorepo pattern for this publisher. Not a cross-org supply chain risk. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cleocode/ct-skills | AI (dependencies): Same-scope @cleocode namespace dependency; consistent with internal monorepo pattern for this publisher. Not a cross-org supply chain risk. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2026.5.132 | 30 / 2 | |
| 2026.3.30 | 16 / 10 | |
| 2026.3.24 | 16 / 10 | |
| 2026.3.10 | 14 / 9 | |
| 2026.3.7 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.3.6 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.3.4 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.3.2 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.3.1 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.3.0 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.2.9 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.2.8 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.2.7 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.2.6 | 13 / 9 | |
| 2026.2.5 | 12 / 8 |
v2026.5.132
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.30
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall.js
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.24
2 findingsScript: node bin/postinstall.js
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.2.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.2.7
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2026.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2026.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.