@clidey/whodb-cli-darwin-arm64
WhoDB CLI binary for macOS ARM64 (Apple Silicon)
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.121.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.115.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.114.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.113.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.112.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.111.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.110.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.109.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.92.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.91.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.90.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.90.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.89.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.88.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.87.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.121.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.92.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.91.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.90.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.90.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.89.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.88.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (ahclidey) on 2026-01-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.87.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (ahclidey) on 2025-12-30, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.