@clidey/whodb-cli-linux-arm
WhoDB CLI server binary for Linux ARMv7
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions publisher is consistent with SLSA-attested CI/CD automation for this package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary optional dep; no deps/keywords/code files is expected for this package type. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.113.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.112.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.111.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.110.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.109.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.106.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.105.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.113.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.112.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.111.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.110.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.109.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.106.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.105.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.