@cliqz/adblocker-puppeteer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/commonjs/index.js | AI (source-diff): Standard compiled adblocker wrapper code; network calls are Puppeteer request interception, not dropper behavior. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/esm/index.js | AI (source-diff): ESM build of same adblocker wrapper; same rationale as commonjs variant. | ai |
v1.34.0
3 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.23.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.