@cloud-copilot/iam-lens
Visibility in IAM in and across AWS accounts
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@cloud-copilot/log | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org logging utility; likely used transitively or conditionally — stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance; legitimate automation pattern for this package. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation confirms CI/CD publish; no code changes or new scripts introduced after dormancy. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cloud-copilot/log | AI (dependencies): First-party @cloud-copilot scoped package; stable ecosystem dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cloud-copilot/iam-expand | AI (dependencies): First-party @cloud-copilot scoped package; stable ecosystem dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:bitset | AI (dependencies): Legitimate bit-manipulation library; consistent with IAM policy analysis use case. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cloud-copilot/iam-collect | AI (dependencies): First-party @cloud-copilot scoped package; stable ecosystem dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cloud-copilot/iam-shrink | AI (dependencies): First-party @cloud-copilot scoped package; stable ecosystem dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cloud-copilot/cli | AI (dependencies): First-party @cloud-copilot scoped package; stable ecosystem dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@cloud-copilot/job | AI (dependencies): First-party @cloud-copilot scoped package; stable ecosystem dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 77 of 77)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.128 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.127 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.126 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.125 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.124 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.123 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.122 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.121 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.120 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.119 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.118 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.117 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.116 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.115 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.114 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.113 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.112 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.111 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.110 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.109 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.108 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.107 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.106 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.105 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.104 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.103 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.102 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.101 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.100 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.99 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.98 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.97 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.96 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.95 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.94 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.93 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.92 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.91 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.90 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.89 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.88 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.87 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.86 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.85 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.84 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.83 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.82 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.81 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.80 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.79 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.78 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.77 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.76 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.75 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.74 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.73 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.72 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.71 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.70 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.69 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.68 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.67 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.65 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.64 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.62 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.59 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.58 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.55 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.54 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.53 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.48 | 11 / 12 | |
| 0.1.35 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.1.33 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.1.29 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.1.28 | 10 / 12 | |
| 0.1.1 | 0 / 12 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 12 |
v0.1.128
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.127
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.126
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.125
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.124
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.123
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.122
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.121
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.120
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.119
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.118
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.117
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.116
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.115
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.114
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.113
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.112
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.111
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.110
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.109
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.108
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.107
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.106
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.105
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.104
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.103
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.102
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.101
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.100
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.99
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.98
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.97
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.96
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.95
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.94
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.93
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.92
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.91
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.90
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.89
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.88
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.87
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.86
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.85
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.84
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.83
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.82
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.81
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.80
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.79
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.78
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.77
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.76
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.75
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.74
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.73
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.72
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.71
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.70
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.69
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.68
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.67
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.65
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.64
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.62
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.59
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.58
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.55
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.54
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.53
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.48
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.