@cloudflare/worker-bundler
Build and bundle Workers at runtime for Cloudflare Worker Loader binding
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): esbuild.wasm is the standard esbuild-wasm dependency binary, required for in-runtime bundling. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled/minified build output with readable comments, not true obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package has SLSA provenance attestation; missing gitHead reflects CI pipeline change, not a supply chain risk. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Cloudflare org restructuring; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD publish pipeline. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): cf-npm-publish is Cloudflare's CI publish account; consistent with org-level automation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/typescript.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript compiler shipped as minified dist artifact; expected for a worker bundler package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA provenance; legitimate Cloudflare org CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a Cloudflare monorepo placeholder pattern; publisher is a trusted long-standing contributor. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Stub/namespace-reservation package in @cloudflare scope from trusted publisher; structural signals are expected. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.2 | 8 / 4 | |
| 0.2.1 | 8 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.4 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.0.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
v0.0.4
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/esbuild.wasm
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (threepointone) on 2026-03-23, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.0.3
4 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • dist/esbuild.wasm
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (threepointone) on 2026-03-11, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.