@codemation/core-nodes-gmail
Optional Gmail integration for Codemation. The package is intentionally trigger-first:
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-CBDXvswQ.d.cts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long union-type lines; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-064i2ite.d.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long union-type lines; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-DmtuzKud.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: bundled .d.ts with long type union lines, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-_q-Ftahd.d.cts | AI (source-diff): Long-line TypeScript declaration file generated by tsdown bundler; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-DMY_Vbj1.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same as above — bundled .d.ts declaration file, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-B8KcDOJP.d.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long lines from complex type unions; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-CkPqhblz.d.cts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long lines from complex type unions; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-HcsMi90I.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same bundled .d.ts declaration file; long lines are type unions, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-yczl4N0d.d.cts | AI (source-diff): Long-line TypeScript declaration rollup from tsdown; not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by bundling all deps into plugin CJS/ESM artifacts via tsdown. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/codemation.plugin.cjs | AI (source-diff): Bundled plugin artifact (tsdown/rolldown output) with googleapis/LangChain deps; no actual dropper behavior in samples. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/codemation.plugin.js | AI (source-diff): ESM counterpart of the same bundled plugin; standard bundler output, not malware. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-BWOh-rJe.d.cts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long union/interface lines; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-Bj5kbvLY.d.ts | AI (source-diff): TypeScript declaration file with long union/interface lines; not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher is GitHub Actions with SLSA attestation; CI/CD publishing is the documented workflow for this org. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-J-XYipso.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same pattern: bundled .d.ts declaration file, long lines from type bundling, not obfuscated code. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-BuSfKJYe.d.cts | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript declaration file with long lines from rolldown; readable type definitions, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index--gtTN-A2.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Same as above — rolldown/tsdown-generated .d.ts with inlined types; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index-DRjOEOl6.d.cts | AI (source-diff): Bundler-generated TypeScript declaration file; long lines are inlined type definitions, not obfuscated executable code. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Decoding Gmail API message payloads (base64url); legitimate and expected for a Gmail integration package. | ai |
Versions (showing 22 of 22)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.4 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.3 | 4 / 11 | |
| 0.2.2 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 10 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.7 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.1.6 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.1.5 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.1.4 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.1.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.1.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.1.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.15 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.14 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.13 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.11 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.7 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.5 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.4 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.3 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.2 | 2 / 6 | |
| 0.0.1 | 2 / 6 |
v0.2.4
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.3
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.2
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.1
3 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.7
5 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.6
5 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.5
5 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.4
5 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
5 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
5 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
5 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.15
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.14
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.13
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.