@codingame/monaco-vscode-08fd81c0-7fd8-5f7c-9776-f918dd532714-common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): CodinGame publishes this package family without provenance; consistent across all versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 23.3.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.2.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.2.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.2.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.1.1 | 3 / 0 |
v23.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.