@codingame/monaco-vscode-accessibility-service-override
VSCode public API plugged on the monaco editor - accessibility service-override
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from human publisher to GitHub Actions CI with SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with org-level CI/CD adoption for CodinGame packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@codingame/monaco-vscode-262ed59d-4f76-57cd-9e9f-1877f26ae049-common | AI (dependencies): Internal UUID-named common dep from CodinGame's own package family; consistent with their versioning pattern across all releases. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@codingame/monaco-vscode-08fd81c0-7fd8-5f7c-9776-f918dd532714-common | AI (dependencies): Internal monorepo UUID-named common package from CodinGame; consistent pattern across all versions of this package family. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@codingame/monaco-vscode-e39a1c8f-7892-5d9b-9987-7b10b79e1a0a-common | AI (dependencies): Internal CodinGame split package following the same namespace/version convention; not an external supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): CodinGame org consistently publishes without Sigstore provenance across all 273 versions; stable false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 61)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 33.0.9 | 2 / 0 | |
| 33.0.8 | 2 / 0 | |
| 33.0.7 | 2 / 0 | |
| 33.0.6 | 2 / 0 | |
| 33.0.5 | 2 / 0 | |
| 33.0.4 | 2 / 0 | |
| 33.0.3 | 2 / 0 | |
| 32.0.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 32.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 32.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 31.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 31.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 30.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 30.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 29.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 29.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 29.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.4.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.4.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.3.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 28.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 27.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.2.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.2.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 26.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 25.1.2 | 2 / 0 | |
| 25.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 25.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 25.0.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 25.0.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 24.3.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 24.2.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 24.1.1 | 2 / 0 | |
| 24.1.0 | 2 / 0 | |
| 23.3.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.2.2 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.2.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.2.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.1.1 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.1.0 | 3 / 0 | |
| 23.0.4 | 3 / 0 |
v33.0.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.0.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.0.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.0.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.0.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v33.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v32.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v32.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v31.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v30.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v30.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v29.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v29.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v29.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v28.4.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v28.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v27.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v26.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v25.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v24.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.