@codingame/monaco-vscode-css-language-features-default-extension
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA provenance attestation; consistent with automated release pipeline for this @codingame org package. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): VSCode extension wrapper; sparse README/keywords is expected for this package family. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established package family; lack of provenance is consistent across all 273 versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 69 of 69)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 36.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 35.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 35.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 35.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 35.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.1.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 34.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 33.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 31.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 30.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 30.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 29.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 29.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 29.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.4.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.4.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.3.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 28.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 27.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 26.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 25.1.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 25.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 25.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 25.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 25.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 24.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 24.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 24.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 24.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.0.4 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 22.1.9 | 1 / 0 | |
| 22.1.8 | 1 / 0 | |
| 22.1.7 | 1 / 0 | |
| 22.1.6 | 1 / 0 | |
| 22.1.5 | 1 / 0 | |
| 22.1.4 | 1 / 0 |
v36.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v35.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v35.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v35.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v35.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v34.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v34.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v28.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.2.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.1.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.0.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (samuel.olivier) on 2026-01-12, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v24.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v24.1.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (samuel.olivier) than the most recent previously approved version (codingame_team) on 2025-12-18, but samuel.olivier is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v23.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v22.1.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v22.1.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v22.1.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v22.1.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v22.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v22.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.