@codingame/monaco-vscode-quickaccess-service-override
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:shady-links-raw-ip | AI (semgrep): Fires on a documentation comment in bundled VSCode source; not an actual network request to a raw IP. | ai |
Versions (showing 32 of 32)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 36.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 35.0.3 | 1 / 0 | |
| 35.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 35.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 32.0.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 32.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 32.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 31.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 31.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 30.0.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 30.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 29.1.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 29.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 29.0.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 24.1.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.3.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.2.2 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.2.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.2.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.1.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.1.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.0.4 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.0.3 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.0.2 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.0.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 23.0.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 22.1.9 | 8 / 0 | |
| 22.1.8 | 8 / 0 | |
| 22.1.7 | 8 / 0 | |
| 22.1.6 | 8 / 0 | |
| 22.1.5 | 8 / 0 | |
| 22.1.4 | 8 / 0 |
v36.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v35.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v35.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v35.0.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (samuel.olivier) on 2026-07-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.