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@codingame/monaco-vscode-swift-default-extension

32
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

nonofrsamuel.oliviernantoniazzimaximecgcodingame_team

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): Large monorepo with 270 versions; dormancy reflects upstream VSCode release cadence, not takeover. ai

Versions (showing 32 of 32)

Version Deps Published
35.0.3 1 / 0
35.0.2 1 / 0
35.0.1 1 / 0
32.0.2 1 / 0
32.0.1 1 / 0
32.0.0 1 / 0
31.0.1 1 / 0
31.0.0 1 / 0
30.0.1 1 / 0
30.0.0 1 / 0
29.1.1 1 / 0
29.1.0 1 / 0
29.0.0 1 / 0
26.0.0 1 / 0
24.1.0 1 / 0
23.3.0 1 / 0
23.2.2 1 / 0
23.2.1 1 / 0
23.2.0 1 / 0
23.1.1 1 / 0
23.1.0 1 / 0
23.0.4 1 / 0
23.0.3 1 / 0
23.0.2 1 / 0
23.0.1 1 / 0
23.0.0 1 / 0
22.1.9 1 / 0
22.1.8 1 / 0
22.1.7 1 / 0
22.1.6 1 / 0
22.1.5 1 / 0
22.1.4 1 / 0

v35.0.3

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v35.0.2

1 finding
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v35.0.1

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: samuel.olivier → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-15, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (samuel.olivier) on 2026-07-15, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.