@colijnit/ioneconnector
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:nodejs-jsencrypt | AI (dependencies): Optional dependency only; primary jsencrypt dep is already declared as a direct runtime dep. Low risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Long-established package with consistent publish history; lack of provenance is not unusual for this ecosystem segment. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 262.1.2 | 8 / 15 | |
| 262.1.1 | 8 / 15 | |
| 262.1.0 | 8 / 15 | |
| 261.1.5 | 8 / 15 | |
| 261.1.0 | 7 / 15 | |
| 260.1.5 | 7 / 15 |
v262.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v262.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v262.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v261.1.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v261.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v260.1.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.