@commercelayer/cli-plugin-webhooks
Commerce Layer CLI Webhooks plugin
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI/CD publishing confirmed by SLSA provenance attestation; expected for this org's packages. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@commercelayer/sdk | AI (dependencies): First-party Commerce Layer SDK dependency; expected for this plugin package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@commercelayer/cli-ux | AI (dependencies): First-party Commerce Layer CLI UX dependency; expected for this plugin package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@commercelayer/cli-core | AI (dependencies): First-party Commerce Layer CLI core dependency; expected for this plugin package. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.3.3 | 8 / 17 | |
| 4.3.2 | 8 / 17 | |
| 4.3.1 | 8 / 17 | |
| 4.3.0 | 8 / 17 | |
| 4.2.11 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.2.10 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.2.9 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.2.8 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.2.7 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.2.6 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.2.5 | 8 / 18 | |
| 4.2.4 | 8 / 18 |
v4.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.11
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.10
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.9
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.8
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.