@commercetools-frontend/cypress
Cypress commands and utilities for Custom Applications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing with SLSA attestation; consistent with org-wide CI/CD adoption for commercetools-frontend packages. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:express | AI (typosquat): Scoped @commercetools-frontend package; Levenshtein match to 'express' is a false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@commercetools-frontend/application-shell | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org sibling dep; phantom-dep heuristic is a stable false positive for monorepo packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/runtime | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped transitive dep; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/semver | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only dep loaded by convention; stable false positive. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:uuid | AI (phantom-deps): Config-file reference; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 27.6.2 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.6.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.6.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.5.4 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.5.3 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.5.2 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.5.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.5.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.4.2 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.4.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.4.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.3.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.2.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.1.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 27.0.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.1.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.0.2 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.0.1 | 9 / 2 | |
| 26.0.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 25.2.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 25.1.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 25.0.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 24.13.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 24.12.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 24.11.0 | 9 / 2 | |
| 24.10.0 | 9 / 2 |
v27.6.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.5.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.5.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.5.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v27.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v26.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.2.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v25.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v24.13.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v24.12.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v24.11.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v24.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.