@composurecdk/cloudwatch
Composable CloudWatch alarm primitives for composureCDK resource packages
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from manual publish to GitHub Actions CI/CD; backed by SLSA provenance attestation and unchanged repo ownership. | ai |
Versions (showing 21 of 21)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.8.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.8.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.6.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.5.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.5.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.8 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.7 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.4.1 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.3.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.3.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.3.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.3.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 5 |
v0.8.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.8.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-24. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.4.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.6
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.5
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.