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@computesdk/archil

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Archil provider for ComputeSDK - exec commands against an Archil disk

10
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

heygarrison

Keywords

computesdkarchilexeccode-executionproviderdisk

Versions (showing 10 of 10)

Version Deps Published
0.4.7 2 / 8
0.4.6 2 / 8
0.4.5 2 / 8
0.4.4 2 / 8
0.4.3 2 / 8
0.4.2 2 / 8
0.4.1 2 / 8
0.4.0 2 / 8
0.3.0 2 / 8
0.2.0 2 / 8

v0.4.7

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: heygarrison → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-20, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (heygarrison) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.4.6

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: heygarrison → GitHub Actions (on 2026-05-29, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (heygarrison) on 2026-05-29, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.