@computesdk/beam
Beam provider for ComputeSDK - containerized sandbox environments with process management and filesystem access
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:computesdk | AI (phantom-deps): computesdk is a peer/config dependency referenced in config files, not a direct import; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.1 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.2.0 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.13 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.12 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.11 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.10 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.9 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.8 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.7 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.6 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.5 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.4 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.3 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.2 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.1 | 3 / 8 | |
| 0.1.0 | 3 / 8 |
v0.2.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (heygarrison) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.2.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (heygarrison) on 2026-07-02, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.