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@computesdk/browserbase

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Browserbase browser provider for ComputeSDK - cloud browser sessions with stealth mode, proxies, and session replay

11
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures No source commit

Maintainers

heygarrison

Keywords

computesdkbrowserbasebrowserheadlessplaywrightpuppeteerstealthproxyprovider

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
phantom-deps phantom-dep:dotenv AI (phantom-deps): dotenv is a transitive dependency used in config; stable for this package type. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:computesdk AI (phantom-deps): computesdk is a peer/framework dependency; stable for this provider package. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:playwright-core AI (phantom-deps): playwright-core is used indirectly through @browserbasehq/sdk; stable for this package. ai

Versions (showing 11 of 11)

Version Deps Published
0.3.10 5 / 8
0.3.9 5 / 8
0.3.7 5 / 8
0.3.6 5 / 8
0.3.5 5 / 8
0.3.4 5 / 8
0.3.3 5 / 8
0.3.2 5 / 8
0.3.1 5 / 8
0.3.0 5 / 8
0.2.0 5 / 8

v0.3.10

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: heygarrison → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-20, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (heygarrison) on 2026-07-20, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.

v0.3.9

2 findings
INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

INFO Publisher changed: heygarrison → GitHub Actions (on 2026-07-09, now via trusted publisher with provenance) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account (GitHub Actions) than the most recent previously approved version (heygarrison) on 2026-07-09, but it carries Sigstore provenance attestation. This means the package moved to a trusted publisher (CI/CD with OIDC, e.g. GitHub Actions) — a supply-chain integrity improvement, not a compromise, since a stolen npm token cannot forge provenance bound to the source repository. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.