@conf-ts/compiler-native-linux-x64-gnu
Native Rust compiler for conf-ts.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): SLSA provenance attestation present; gitHead absence is outweighed by Sigstore CI/CD attestation. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): Platform-specific native Rust .node addon; binary distribution is the entire purpose of this package, backed by SLSA provenance. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Minimal native binary distribution package; no deps/keywords/docs expected for this type of package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.7 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.0.1 | 0 / 0 |
v0.0.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.7
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cryrivers.
v0.0.6
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: cryrivers.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.5
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiler-native.linux-x64-gnu.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiler-native.linux-x64-gnu.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.2
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiler-native.linux-x64-gnu.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • compiler-native.linux-x64-gnu.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.